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PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION IN
A DEVELOPING COUNTRY*

STEPHEN J. LEACOCK**

I have endeavored to construe the provisions of an Act which
has conferred on this Court an unusual jurisdiction of great delicacy, dealing with large interests and involving questions of
extreme complexity, some of which I think I can properly say
have been left at large by the Act.'

The Public Utilities 2 Act, 3 of Barbados is the Act 4 referred to in the
above quotation. The Act 5 establishes a Board 6 comprised of five members
who are appointed by the Minister. 7 The Minister appoints one of the
members as Chairman, who holds the office as long as he remains a
member of the Board. The Act provides that if the Chairman is unable
to act, or if there is a vacancy in the office, then any other member may
act as Chairman.8 Members of the Board hold office for the period
specified in the instrument of appointment, which can be up to five years.9
The Board is vested with authority to make regulations governing
every rate established, requested or received by any public utility.10
Further, every public utility must file with the Board the tariffs showing
all rates established by such utility. The Board also has power to fix
temporary rates pending final determination of any rate inquiry, 12 and
may do so if it is of the opinion that temporary rates are required in the
13
public interest.
*The views expressed in this paper are those of the author alone.
**M.A., LL.M., Barrister. Associate Prof. of Law, University of Cincinnati,
College of Law. Formerly Assessor to the Barbados Public Utilities Board; Member of Barbados Public Utilities Panel; Director of Company Law Program, University of the West Indies, Faculty of Law, Cave Hill, Barbados; Visiting Associate
Tutor, Hugh Wooding Law School, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago.
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The Board has power to investigate complaints that any public utility
14
is in breach of any law which the Board has jurisdiction to administer,
or complaints that any public utility is in breach of any regulation or
order of the Board. 15 In the execution of these powers, the Board must
ensure that a copy of the complaint is served upon the person against whom
it is made, and it must also serve notice on the party concerned requiring
him to satisfy the complaint or to answer it in writing specifying a
reasonable period of time within which the party must comply. 16
17
If the party against whom the complaint has been made satisfies
8
the complaint, the Board must dismiss the complaint.' If, on the other
hand, the party against whom the complaint is made does not satisfy' 9 the
complaint within the period of time fixed by the Board, the Board is
under obligation to consider all the facts and circumstances surrounding
the complaint in order to ascertain whether there are reasonable grounds
for investigating the complaint any further. If the Board is of the opinion
that such reasonable grounds exist, it is under a duty to fix a time and
place for a hearing. 20 In this respect, however, the public interest is
paramount, and if the Board is of the opinion that, in the public interest,
a hearing is not necessary, then the Board may dismiss the complaint
without a hearing. 21 The Act makes all hearings public, 22 and all parties
have the right to be heard in person or by Counsel.

RATE FIXING
In fixing rates, the Board has to interpret and apply the Act which
is not an easy task. The concept of utility regulation is unknown in
England, 23 the source of Barbados common law and indeed the source of
the common law of the Commonwealth Caribbean. 24 In search of guidance
the Board looked to United States and Canadian utility regulation deci26
sions 25 and drew on these in coming to its own conclusions. The utility
concerned in the first rate case under the Act appealed to the High
Court 27 against the Board's decision, and the case was decided by S.E.
Gomes, the Chief Judge. 28 The latter 29 turned unashamedly to American
decisions and textbooks for guidance, for there was no history or tradition
of utility regulation in England to which he could turn. He was careful
to point out however that
...the passages from American judicial decisions and text books
set out in this judgment are quoted not as authorities binding on
30
this court, but because I have adopted them.
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This is clearly correct, for decisions of American courts and Commonwealth courts other than the Judicial Committee of the Private Council
in England are of persuasive :authority only.
The Chief Judge approached the problem from an impeccable premise.
He observed:
The Act is one to provide for the iregulation of public utilities...
It is important to bear in mind that the public utility is privately
owned and therefore, it is entitled to manage and conduct its
business as it likes except insofar as its activities in -those respects
are curtailed or are regulated by the Board under the provisions
of the Act. 31
There were, however, some shortcomings in the Act, some areas "left
at large, ' 32 indeed some of them fundamental. Nevertheless, the ingenuity
of S.E. Gomes, C.J. was comparable to the task.
The first ,question for consideration was:
....
is any test or standard prescribed by the Act by which the
33
fairness and reasonableness of the rate is to be determined?
Unfortunately the Act had not specifically and definitively set out
a test to be applied, but S.E. Gomes, C.J. was able to spell out from
a consideration of a number of the sections of the Act. The test was to
be found in subsection (2) of section 21 of the Act. In fact, this subsection really deals with temporary rates, but as S.E. Gomes, C.J. observed:
That subsection provides that whenever the Board ....considers
that the rates of the public utility are producing a return in
excess of a Jair return upon the fair value of the property of
the concern, used and useful in its public service it may prescribe
such temporary rates . . . as will produce a fair return upon
such fair value, and those rates are to become permanent . ...
unless the public utility complains that they are unfair and
unreasonable. Although this subsection deals with ... temporary
rates the test or standard prescribed also applies, in my view,
to the fixing of non-temporary rates for no other test is provided
34
in the remainderof the provisions of the Act.
This reasoning is patently sound, and if reinforcement for this view
was necessary, then his Lordship found it in the fact that according to
the subsection in question such temporary rates became permanent unless
the utility objected, and he thought it would be strange if some other
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test could have been intended to apply to permanent rates which, for
example, were fixed as permanent from the outset. There was no need
for two or more tests to be applied to permanent rates, whether they
had become permanent after having first been temporary, or whether
they had originally been intended to be permanent.
As his Lordship pointed out,1 5 subsection (1) of section 53 took the
matter a step further and authorized the Board to appraise the utility's
property from time to time. This would ensure that the Board would be
aware at any time of the fair value of any utility's property used and
useful in its public services, and would thereby be able to ascertain
whether such utility was earning a fair return on such fair value and
was thus complying with the Act. Accordingly, ". . . in determining
whether the rates are fair and reasonable, the criterion is that which will
produce a fair return on the fair value of the company's property, used
and useful in its public services ... "6
Establishing a formula is all well and good. However, in any particular case the formula has to be applied to concrete facts, and has to
be meaningful in deciding whether or not the facts fit the formula and
measure up to the criterion or the criteria. It would inevitably follow that
the court would have to decide what was meant by terms such as "fair
return" and "fair value" for the concept of fairness is an elusive one and
depends on a large number of value judgments and subsidiary concepts
which will tend to vary from one society to another. Unfortunately as
S.E. Gomes, C.J. pointed out: "The Act does not say what the expression
"fair value" means nor does it prescribe any formula or method by which
it is to be ascertained." 37 This omission by the Act, admitted the Chief
Judge, 31 caused him and the Board some embarrassment. 39 However, the
Board had referred to the American case of Smyth v. Ames 40 and had
identified the guiding principle followed in the American Courts. Thus
with regard to "fair value" the Board had found that:
• . . the sole principle which has survived from these decisions
is what the Company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon
the value of that which it employs for the public convenience:
on the other hand, what the public is entitled to demand is
from it than the services rendered by
that no more be exacted
41
it are reasonably worth.
The ascertainment of what is "fair value" is a balancing process,
bearing in mind the interests of the company on the one hand and those
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of the consuming public on the other, with the Board's concept of what
is reasonable as the final arbiter. The court agreed with these observations
of the Board.
Clearly, the intended end product of any process of establishing a
fair value is a numerical figure, a basis on which to function. As the
court pointed out ". . . it is impossible to value the undertaking of a public
utility unless a basis, or what is called a rate base is found; ... there
must 42 be a rate base, the base with which the return may be compared
and tested to see whether the rate is fair and reasonable. ' 43 Although the
Act did not spell this out, as his Lordship observed, 44 the provisions of
the Act were not entirely silent on the point, for the term "rate base"
appears in subsection (2) of section 53 of the Act.
Unfortunately, though, this is another matter "left at large" by the
Act, for nowhere does it state how the rate base is to be calculated. His
Lordship turned to the United States where, among the methods used,
were found the following:
(a) historical cost or prudent investment;
(b) replacement cost less depreciation; and,
(c) present fair value- "the value of the property at the time
the rate is determined." 45
His Lordship observed" that the American textbook authors had pointed
out that the determination of the proper rate base is a most difficult and
complex question, and indeed one author 47 had stated that it had been a
subject of controversy ever since the rates of public utilities were first
regulated. His Lordship pointed out 48 that in any event, a rate base 49
was fundamental in ascertaining the "fair value" of the utility's property
used and useful in its public service.
Thus after expressing his awareness of the extremely difficult task
of fixing a rate base, his Lordship expressed relief at not being "called
upon to attempt to give any pontifical pronouncements" 50 on the matter,
and settled for the "ready-made" base that presented itself. As he observed:
. ..the book value of the property is based on the recent valuation .. .I consider that that method may well be used, and . ..
I will therefore employ that method . . .51
This observation is clearly right. A recent valuation conducted by
experts in the valuation of properties of this kind will normally be ac-
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cepted by the Board,5 2 provided that the Board is satisfied after the valuation has been put in evidence by the experts who made the valuation and
they have been cross-examined at the hearing. Of course a recent valuation by experts is not the only method that need be accepted by the Board.
In a recent rate case,5 3 the Board arrived at a rate base after hearing
exhaustive evidence on the efficacy of various methods of trending in the
computation of the rate base for the particular utility. The Board finally
s
4
fixed a revalued rate base based on the methods advocated before it.
In the final analysis, the rate base must be fixed after a careful evaluation
of all the circumstances of the particular case.
Finding the rate base is, of course, only half the story. The Board
has to allow a fair rate of return on the fair value of the utility's property
used and useful in its public service. Again, unfortunately, this matter is
"left at large" by the Act. "Here again the Act does not specify or indicate
any scale or formula on or by which it may be ascertained." 55 The court
sought guidance once again from the American experience adopting as
its own the following views of Nichols:
The fixing of just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of
the investor and consumer interests. From the standpoint of the
investor it is required that there be enough revenue for capital
costs of the business, including service on the debt and dividends
on the stock. The return to the equity owner should be commensurate with return on investments in other enterprises having
corresponding risks. The return should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise so as to main56
tain its credit and to attract capital.
A fair rate of return therefore will depend on the state of the economy
in which the utility operates. Such factors as the cost of capital, whether
debt or equity, the level of dividends in enterprises of comparable financial
risks operating in the same economy, the capacity to pay of the consumers
in that economy, as well as the quality of the service that is provided. For:
The right of the utility is not the only matter deserving attention:
there is also the public interest to be considered, for the consumers are entitled to demand that no more is exacted from them
57
than the services rendered are reasonably worth.
Having balanced all the competing interests, ultimately the Board must
come to a reasoned conclusion on the basis of the evidence before it.
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It is important to note that the utility is entitled to a return only on
those assets which are used and useful in the public service. A determination, therefore, has to be made in order to identify which assets satisfy
the criteria and which do not. The Act is also silent as to what these
criteria are. It is submitted, however, that in the first instance what is
involved is a determination of whether or not a particular asset is actually
used by the utility in its public service. Then, a second determination is
necessary, and this relates to the extent to which the particular asset is
used. In other words, what is the level and extent of use? The answer to
these questions will be important in determining whether or not the particular asset is useful in rendering public service.
For example, in the United States of America, providing housing
accommodations for a number of senior engineering staff near to the utility
plant may be salutary, and the value of these accommodations may well be
included in the rate base of the utility, the regulatory authority accepting
that the properties are used and useful in the public service. Undoubtedly,
proximity of engineering staff to the utility plant is vital when there are
breakdowns or accidents, especially in a country as large as the United
States where great distances exist between parts of the country. However,
in a small island just twenty-one miles long and fourteen miles wide the
argument for including the value of similar accommodations in the rate
base as being assets used and useful in rendering public service diminishes
in cogency. Thus, in a recent rate case,58 the Board ruled:
...
[T]he Board is of the opinion that the use of company assets
for staff residences'is marginally justifiable as property used and
useful in rendering electric service to the public. And since use of
such property in this case is most uneconomic, will disallow their
59
value . . . from the Company's rate base.

Of course, in this case there was the added factor that it was most
uneconomic. However, it is submitted that marginally justifiable use and
usefulness would in any event not be enough to warrant inclusion in the
rate base.
Similarly, whereas it is arguable that cars allocated to some staff
members of a telephone company for use in company business may be
included in the rate base, nevertheless, if the company allows private use
of such cars by said staff, it is submitted that to allow inclusion of all
expenses of running such cars under expenses of assets used and useful
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in rendering public service would not be in keeping with a correct interpretation of the Act. Thus, in a recent rate hearing, 60 the Board ruled that
it would deduct:
• . . an amount of $28,000, the expenses attributable to private
use of motor vehicles which the Company provides for members
of its staff. There are twenty-eight such vehicles and the Board
61
imputes $1,000 annually on each vehicle as such expenses.
This, it is submitted, is undoubtedly a correct and clear ruling as to
the interpretation of the meaning of allowable and non-allowable expenses
of property used and useful in rendering public service. For, by allowing
private use of the motor vehicles in this way, a utility would not be distinguishing between use on the company's business and personal use by
the staff. 'Clearly the costs relating to personal use by the staff are hardly
costs pertaining to use and usefulness in rendering public service, and it
could hardly be argued that such costs should be borne by consumers of
the utility's services.
BURDEN OF PROOF
Section [22] provides that in any proceeding upon a complaint
involving any proposed increase in rates the burden of proof to
show that the rates involved are fair and reasonable shall be upon
the public utility.6 2 (Italics added).
This requirement of the Act is most desirable, not only on the basis
of the doctrine that he who asserts must prove, but because the utility is
in possession of the relevant information relating to its costs, past, present
and future. It alone has full details of the demand for its services and potential growth of that demand, as well as on proposed plans for expansion,
equipment in use, and similar matters.
The Act makes it clear, therefore, that if anyone thinks that a proposed increase in rates is not fair and reasonable, the appropriate course
of action is to complain 63 to the Board. It is then up to the Board to
decide whether or not to65 hold a hearing, 64 in which case the burden of
proof rests on the utility.
On the other hand:
Where the complaint is in respect of an existing rate, the burden
is on the complainant 66 on the principle that he who asserts must
prove . . .67 (Italics added).
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Of course, this proposition of law only governs complaints other than

those made by the Board, for where the Board is the complainant:
• . . the burden is on the public utility irrespective of whether
the proceedings are in respect of an existing or proposed rate. 68
There is wisdom in the adoption of these principles by the Act. Clearly,
when the Board complains, whether against an existing or a proposed
rate, the burden of proof ought not to be placed on the Board, for the
latter's function is primarily judicial 69 and not accusatorial. In relation
to rates, the clear intention of the Legislature was to confer on the Board
discretion whether to complain or not; 70 also whether to hold a hearing or
not. 71 Of course, anyone having an interest in the subject matter may
complain, 72 but if the complainant is not the Board and the complaint
relates to an existing rate, then the complainant undertakes the task of
shouldering the burden of proof.
In relation to existing rates, therefore, a potential complainant has
at least two courses of action. He can either try to persuade the Board
to complain, and if the Board complains the burden of proof will fall
upon the utility in the resulting proceedings; alternatively he can complain himself and seek to discharge the burden of proof which will fall
on him. The apparent intention of the Legislature was undoubtedly to
ensure that the Board played the central role in the regulation of public
utilities. If the Board is satisfied that the circumstances justify a complaint, then one would assume that the Board would complain. If, on the
other hand, the Board is not convinced that a complaint should be made,
then any person who wishes to complain will have to file the complaint.
Thus, while the Act does not prevent anyone from complaining, by imposing the burden of proof on the complainant the Act ensures that unwarranted complaints will be unlikely. Moreover, if one remembers that
normally in civil matters costs follow the event, 73 a potential complainant

will hardly act rashly.
75
ASSESSORS,74 MEMBERS AND BIAS

Section 4(2) of the Act provides for the appointment of two assessors-one from the Public Utilities Panel76 and the other selected to
represent the users of the particular public utility involved in the proceedings. Assessors can be appointed for any complaint, hearing or other
proceeding of the Board. The appointments may be requested by the
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Board or may be effected as a result of an application by any of the
parties concerned. Alternatively, assessors are appointed if the Minister
thinks it expedient to do so. The section states:
In selecting such assessors, regard shall be had to the particular
class of case or proceeding to be heard so that as nearly as the
circumstances may permit, the persons selected as assessors shall
be conversant with and have knowledge of the technicalities that
may arise in considering such particular complaint, hearing or
77
other proceeding.
This is infinitely reasonable, for the functions of the Board go beyond those of a court of law. In a court of law, the legal rules relating
to evidence govern the material and the manner in which such material
can be presented. Further, the court relies on the adversary principle, and,
therefore, must decide on the basis of the evidence presented under
oath, taking such evidence at face value. 78 Proceedings before the Board
are not intended to be restricted to the rigidity and formality of a court
of law, and the adversary principle does not apply as such, for there
may be no objectors to an application for an increase in rates. In such
a situation, had the ordinary adversary principle applied, the particular
utility would have been entitled to prevail in every respect in relation
79
to its application on a similar basis to judgment in default of defense.
Proceedings before the Board are, therefore, to some extent, inquisitorial.
Assessors, and indeed Board members as well, are under obligation
to cross-examine witnesses whenever they feel it necessary in order to
obtain the fullest information on which the Board is to base its decision.
The expertise of the assessors, therefore, becomes crucial, for only if they
are conversant with the issues involved in any particular proceeding can
they effectively assist the Board in extracting information from the witnesses in the deliberations of the Board when all the evidence has been
taken, and in the analysis and evaluation of the decision of the Board
when made.
A high degree of close questioning by the assessors and the Board
members may, therefore, be necessary in any particular proceeding depending, of course, on whether or not there are objectors, and depending
upon the extent to which the assessors and the Board are satisfied that
the fullest information is before the Board. To persons unfamiliar with
an inquisitorial process the extent to which the assessors and the Board
members question witnesses may seem unusual,10 and they may form the
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view that the assessors and the Board are overparticipating in the proceedings, bearing in mind that judges must not only be impartial but
must also seem s to be impartial.
To counsel accustomed only to the expectation of silent implacable
observation by the judge, the participation of the assessors and the
Board might well be novel and startling; but the inquisitorial nature of
the proceedings requires participation of this nature, and indeed it is the
bounden duty of the assessors and the members of the Board to ensure
that all necessary facts and information are before the Board. Otherwise,
they would not be complying with their obligations under the Act.
Assessors are not judges in the strict sense of the word; 2 they are,
as the ordinary dictionary states, advisers. However, the role of the assessor appointed to represent the interests of the users of a particular utility
is somewhat analogous to that of arbitrators in a commercial arbitration, 3
although the analogy is not perfect. In a commercial arbitration,
once the arbitrators have disagreed and appointed an umpire
they are Junctus officio as arbitrators. If they attend, as they do,
the hearing before the umpire, it is as advocates for the parties
who appointed them.. 84
...

Assessors, however, retain their judicial/advisory role throughout the
proceedings, and only the assessor appointed to represent the interests of
the users of the utility can be said to become, in addition, an advocate
for one side. Both assessors have to be aware of the interests of the particular utility and the interests of the users of the utility. They both act
as judges in the proceedings in relation to the evidence presented to the
Board, observing the demeanor of witnesses, reaching conclusions on the
competency of experts called as witnesses, and similar matters.
This view, it is submitted, interprets fully and accurately the intention of the Legislature in drafting the Act. For, the Act states8 5 that one
of the assessors must be selected from the Public Utilities Panel, and the
other must be selected to represent the users of the particular utility. The
86
composition of the Public Utilities Panel is also prescribed by the Act.
It states that the panel shall consist of not more than six persons to be
nominated by the Minister after consultation with such public utilities as
he shall see fit.
The reason for giving the Minister power to consult with a utility
or utilities as he shall see fit is to secure for the utilities a sense of participating in the appointment of the person or persons who comprise the
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panel, who, after all, are to some extent expected to represent their interests. The Legislature was careful, however, to reserve to the Minister
the right to decide whether or not to consult with any of the utilities,
inasmuch as the Minister need only consult with such public utilities as
he shall see fit.87 The clear intention of the Legislature, it is submitted,
is not to give any utility or utilities a power of veto. It is further submitted that the Legislature has made it clear that the primary obligation
of the assessor selected from the Panel is to carry out his judicial/advisory
functions.18 In relation to the assessor chosen to represent the interests of
9
the users of the utility, his primary obligation is to act as advocate for
the interests of the users of the particular utility. The Legislature has
90
excluded both of them from the decisions of the Board, thus reserving
the decisions of the Board to its members.
The differing nature of their obligations delimits the parameters
within which the principles governing bias91 apply to members and assessors when the Board is acting judicially or quasi-judicially. Thus,
conduct of the members of the Board which shows obvious partiality
for one party to the proceedings would render the Board's Order voidable. 92 Similarly, affiliation with one party or the other would have the

same effect. In this respect, the rules governing bias in courts and tribunals when acting judicially or quasi-judicially are the same. However,
normally, the rules governing bias in courts are clearer and more fully
established, and the standards governing all courts are essentially the
same. 93 In relation to tribunals in general, the problem is more intractable. Tribunals vary considerably, and the problem may well be one of
considering what is the correct standard to apply to a particular tribunal,
rather than what standard applies to tribunals simpliciter.
In considering bias in courts, the fundamental principle is the judge's
94
neutrality. This is of such crucial importance that it must exist in appearance and in fact. There must be freedom from even the appearance
of bias. The standard which applies to courts does not, therefore, necessitate proof of bias in fact. If it can be shown that an apprehension of
bias is reasonably justified, then the decision of the particular court will
be set aside.
In relation to the Board members, the principles are clear. The
enunciation by Viscount Cave is lucid and instructive:
If there is one principle which forms an integral part of the
English law95 it is that every member of a body engaged in a
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judicial proceeding must be able to act judicially; and it has
been held over and over again that if a member of such a body
is subject to a bias (whether financially or other) in favor of or
against either party to the dispute or in such a position that a
bias must be assumed, he ought not to take part in a decision
or even sit upon the tribunal. This rule has been asserted not
only in the cases of Courts of Justice and other judicial tribunals
but in the case of authorities which, though in no sense to be
96
called 'Courts' have to act as judges of the rights of others.
The common law requires the Board to be disinterested and impartial. Such principles are necessary if public confidence in the administration of justice is to be ensured. 97 Freedom from the likelihood of bias,
however, is a different matter from the situation where there is an allegation of actual bias. Where, for instance, there is, in fact, freedom from
the likelihood of bias but there is an allegation that the Board or a
member of the Board is, in fact, biased because of what he has said or
done or because he has associated with a party to the proceedings before
the Board, bias would then have to be proved. It would have to be established as a fact that there was a real likelihood of bias; whereas in
the situation under discussion it is accepted that because bias is possible,
given a particular set of circumstances, then the courts will hold that the
possibility of bias taints the particular decision. The decision is then set
aside because of the possibility of there having been bias, i.e., because
bias could have occurred, not because they are satisfied that bias did,
in fact, occur or was likely to have occurred. Indeed, the consideration
of whether or not bias did, in fact, occur is an irrelevant consideration
in the circumstances. The only consideration is whether or not, in these
circumstances, it is possible that bias could have occurred. If the answer
is yes, then the decision will be set aside for potential bias. 91
The principles governing potential bias in relation to courts are perfectly clear, and it is submitted that the same principles apply to a tribunal such as the Board when acting judicially or quasi-judicially and,
99
of course, to its members. In Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors,
the Lord Chancellor of England presided over a case in which one of the
parties was a company in which the Lord Chancellor owned a number
of shares. In spite of the fact that the Lord Chancellor is the Head of
the Judiciary in England, and in spite of the eminence of this officer,
nevertheless, the decision was set aside. It was set aside not on the basis
of any allegation of bias in the Lord Chancellor himself, for, indeed, it
was accepted by the Court that the Lord Chancellor was of impeccable
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character and renowned impartiality. The House of Lords set the decision
aside on the basis of potential bias. The principle being that the fact that
the circumstances created a situation of potential bias, then the decision
must be set aside. In spite of the fact that the decision might be perfection itself in terms of objectivity and impartiality, it will be nevertheless
set aside. Lord Campbell is transcendent in this passage:
• . . No one can suppose that Lord Cottenham could be, in the
remotest degree, influenced by the interest that he had in this
concern; but my Lords, it is of the last importance that the
maxim that no man is to be a judge in his own cause should be
held sacred. And that is not to be confined to a cause in which
he is a party, but applies to a cause in which he has an interest
. . . And it will have a most salutary influence on these tribunals
when it is known that this high Court of last resort, in a case
in which the Lord Chancellor of England had an interest, considered that his decree was on that account a decree not according to law, and was set aside. This will be a lesson to all inferior
tribunals to take care not only that in their decrees they are not
influenced by their personal interest, but to avoid the appearance of laboring under such an influence. 100
Indeed, each member of the Board has to make a declaration 0
prior to his appointment that he does not have any pecuniary interest 0 2
in any of the public utilities governed by the Act. Thus, if a member of
the Board who takes part in a decision has a pecuniary interest10 3 in any
of the parties to the hearing, this would normally 04 render the decision
105
voidable.
Being a member of an entity, whether incorporated or not, which is
a party to the proceedings may also give rise to an allegation of bias.
The allegation being that mere membership in the entity per se would
fall foul of the principle of potential bias, namely that once it is shown
that a member of the Board is a member of one of the parties to the
proceedings, then the decision of the Board would be voidable, without
more.
It has been held that mere membership of one of the parties to the
proceedings before a tribunal is not necessarily enough to make a decision of the tribunal voidable. 10 6 The court seems to have drawn a distinction between: mere membership on the one hand, and being a member of the governing body of the particular organization, i.e., being a
member of the nucleus which directs the operations of the particular
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organization. If, therefore, a member of a tribunal is also a member of
the directing nucleus of an organization taking part in proceedings before that tribunal, this fact, it is submitted, would render the tribunal's
decision voidable. 107 However, if a member of the tribunal is merely a
member of the organization which is a party to the proceedings, it is
submitted that the simple fact of membership in such organization will
08
not necessarily render the tribunal's decision voidable.
The infinite good sense of the principles of potential bias based on
pecuniary interest is patent and needs no further elaboration. As to the
principles governing membership in organizations appearing before a
tribunal, it is submitted that they are salutary. Clearly, where a member
of a tribunal is also a member of the governing nucleus of an organization appearing before that tribunal, he falls squarely within the principle
of being "prosecutor" or "defendant"' 1 9 and judge in the same cause,
and such action should indeed render the tribunal's decision voidable.
However, mere membership in an organization appearing before a tribunal should not be a disqualifying feature rendering the decision of
every tribunal voidable. For mere membership does not necessarily identify the member so closely with the decision of the directing nucleus of
the organization as to render him "prosecutor" or "defendant" 110 and
judge in the same cause. This makes it possible for the courts to make
further inquiry into the circumstances of the particular case to determine
whether, in the light of all the circumstances, the decision of the tribunal
should be set aside.
As regards the Board, however, because of the "large interests""'
with which it has to deal in the course of construing and applying the
Act, its impartiality must be above reproach. It is submitted, therefore,
that if a member of the Board is also a member of an organization which
is taking part in proceedings before the Board, without more, this will
render the Board's decision voidable. It is the nature of the functions of
the Board which renders this submission decisive.
If, on the other hand, there is an allegation of bias against the Board
consisting of a broad allegation of favoring one side or the other, or
association with either side, the onus of establishing bias will rest on the
party that alleges it. Proof would have to reach the ordinary standard
in civil cases, namely, proof on a preponderance of probability. 1 2 It
seems, however, that what might amount to bias in relation to the conduct of a court will not necessarily be sufficient to support an allegation
of bias in relation to every tribunal, when acting judicially or quasi-
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judicially. For example, the presence of the acting clerk with the justices
when they were considering their decision in R. v. Sussex Justices, ex
parte McCarthy1 13 was fatal to that decision in the light of the acting
clerk's association with one of the parties to the litigation. Whereas,
similar circumstances have been held not to support an allegation of bias
114
Neverin relation to a tribunal acting judicially or quasi-judicially.
in
court
the
by
applied
principles
strict
the
that
theless, it is submitted
115
Board
the
to
apply
also
would
R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy 6
on the strength of my previous arguments.'
Of course, a statute'1 7 may authorize a tribunal to act as both prosecutor or, rather, accuser and judge. In such an event, an allegation of
118
Under section 30(1) the Act
bias on that ground will not succeed.
authorizes the Board to complain against any utility operating under the
Act in the circumstances set out in the section, and section 32(2) authorizes the Board to enter upon a hearing if as a result of such a complaint reasonable ground exists for investigating such complaint. Clearly,
an allegation of bias arising from the fact that the Board was complainant and also judge in the proceedings arising out of the same complaint
would not succeed, for the Legislature can, by clear words to this effect,
empower a tribunal to act in derogation of the rule that no one shall act
as judge in his own cause, 119 and it is submitted that the Legislature has
in fact done so here.
Bias in relation to assessors is of far less importance. It is submitted
that its only relevance would be in relation to deciding whether or not
a particular person may sit as an assessor if, for example, he is challenged
by one of the parties to the proceedings. In other words, it would relate
to the question as to whether or not a particular person ought to be disqualified from sitting with the Board. However, it is submitted that this
has no bearing whatsoever on the question as to whether or not a decision
of the Board ought to be set aside for bias, for, indeed, assessors are not
members of the Board nor do they participate in the decisions of the
120
Board.
It may be arguable that an assessor may not have any pecuniary
interest in any public utility. 121 Such an argument could be based on the
wording of section 14 of the Act which states that "no member, or
ollicer122 of the Board shall directly or indirectly . . ." have any pecuniary
interest in any public utility. 123 The use of the word "officer" in this
section is probably broad enough to embrace an assessor appointed under
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the Act, for "Any assessor so appointed shall ...exercise all the powers
124 However, the Act does
and functions of a member of the Board . . .-.
not specify any sanction for breach of this section.
The Act has specifically barred assessors from taking part in any
decisions of the Board. Section 4(4)125 states ". . the decision of the
Board shall be the decision of the members only excluding any such
assessor . .."126 Assessors are, therefore, not judges in the full sense of
the term 127 in relation to any proceedings before the Board, for it is
submitted that to hold otherwise would be untenable.
The principles governing bias, therefore, are not applicable to assessors in the same manner as to members of the Board, for the Act does
not envisage strict impartiality on the part of the assessors. On the contrary, the Act envisages that at least one assessor may be partial. It states
that one of the assessors is to be ". . . selected to represent the users ol
the Public Utility concerned."'128 It is difficult to fly in the face of the
clear wording of the Act. It is submitted that the clear meaning of "to
represent" is to exert oneself to protect the interests of the particular
party one represents. In relation to the assessor selected to represent the
users of the public utility, the question of bias based on having a pecuniary interest in one of the parties opposing the utility might be moot,
for one would think that the representation might well be the more
vigorous if the representative is financially interested in the outcome.
Similarly, membership in the directing nucleus of an organization before
the Board, or ordinary membership, or association with or an appearance
of favoring a party who is also representing the interests of the users
of the particular utility would be irrelevant, for the question of bias in
favor of the interests of the users of the particular utility is what is placed
in issue by the Act.
Of course, if the assessor chosen to represent the interest of the
users of the utility seemed to be biased in favor of the utility, or if it
could be proved that he was so biased, it is submitted that this would
constitute sufficient ground for preventing him from sitting if the proceedings had not yet commenced. If the proceedings had, then it is sub129
mitted that it would be a sufficient ground for his removal.
A pecuniary interest in a utility 130 could, on the earlier
arguments,
infringe section 14 of the Act. It is submitted, however, that this would
only be relevant in deciding whether or not a particular person may sit
as an assessor either to represent the interests of the users of the partic-
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ular utility or as an appointee from the panel. If such a person did sit,
it is submitted that the decision of the Board would nevertheless not be
assailable, for assessors are not judges under the Act."' However, it is
submitted that it would be sufficient ground to disqualify such assessor
132
or to represent the
from sitting either as an appointee from the panel
133
users of the Public Utility concerned.
By giving one assessor a specific mandate and the other none, the
134
Legislature might have been recognized the economic power of utilities
and might have been seeking to redress the balance in terms of the representation of the interests of the users of the utility. Further support for
this view arises from the fact that the Act places no limit on the number
of parties who may oppose a utility in relation to any proceedings before
the Board.
POWERS OF INVESTIGATION AND PENALTIES
The Board has power 135 to subpoena witnesses, to administer oaths,
and to examine witnesses. If the Board deems it necessary or proper in
any proceeding, investigation or hearing, it can compel the production of
such books, records, papers and documents as it sees fit. Under the same
section, the Board can perform all necessary and proper acts in the lawful exercise of its powers or the performance of its duties.
136
counsel for one of the
In Re The Barbados Telephone Co. Ltd.,
objectors made an application under the above section for the production
of the minutes of four directors' meetings. Counsel for the Telephone
Company opposed the application on the grounds that said books are of
a priviledged and confidential nature 137 and, therefore, should not be
disclosed generally. He, of course, recognized the Board's power to examine any document of the company. After deliberation, the Board ruled
that the objection was sustained on the stated grounds, but that in the
public interest the Board itself would examine the stated minutes and
would determine whether any matters relevant to the hearing were contained therein and whether such matters ought to be disclosed in the
public interest. The Board ruled that such relevant matters, if any, would
then be copied and made available at the hearing.

This ruling was clearly right. It has been stated in a recent case:
There are some things which may be required to be disclosed in
the public interest in which no confidence can be prayed in aid
to keep them secret.13
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Clearly, the only way to ascertain whether any information in the minutes was relevant to the hearing was to actually examine the minutes in
question.
The Board examined the minutes relating to the specified directors'
meetings and then ruled that certain matters therein were relevant to the
hearing. The Board then ordered that copies of the relevant passages be
made and that the copies be made available to the parties who were objecting to the proposed increase in rates. Recognizing the confidentiality
of the contents of the minutes, the Board ordered that proceedings relating to matters contained in the minutes be held in closed session. By
adopting this solution, therefore, not only was the public interest which
required the examination of the minutes safeguarded by the Board, but
the confidential nature of the minutes was also respected.
The Act makes obstruction or intereference with any member of the
Board, or any officer or person in the exercise of the rights conferred or
duties imposed by or under the Act an offense. 13 9 However, the offense
is a summary one, and the penalty imposed on anyone convicted of this
140
offense is a maximum fine of one hundred dollars.
The Board is not empowered to punish anyone for contempt. It cannot imprison anyone who disrupts the proceedings, or who shows disregard or disrespect for them. This point was made by counsel in a recent rate hearing, 141 and suggestions were made as to proposals for remedying this lacuna in the law. Counsel said in his opening address to the
Board:
I am submitting that the Board should draw [the] attention of
Government to . . . statutory tribunals such as the Public Utilities Board, - . when [there] is an attempt to bring the Board
and its functions [in] to public contempt, [the] Government
142
should take action to protect members of the Board.
Unfortunately, the sub judice rule does not apply to the proceedings
of the Board. The question of comment on current proceedings is normally dealt with in a voluntary way, whereby the Board obtains an
assurance from the utility and the other parties that they will not indulge
in comment on the proceedings. Counsel for the utility in the same recent
rate case 14 regretted the fact that:
.. . [W]hile companies cooperate with the Board by making no
public comment once proceedings have begun, . . . other people
44
... make all kinds of remarks.
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Of course, there may be arguments for not interfering with a voluntary

procedure once it is observed by all the parties to whom it applies. However, if the procedure is not observed by some of the parties, then the
arguments supporting a strict legally formulated procedure tend to gain
precedence.
The ultimate penalty which can be imposed upon any utility operating under the Act is pretty severe. The court can order that it be wound
up. 145 If a utility fails to comply with an order of the Board within the
time specified by the Board, the Board can take over the full and complete management 46 of the utility for up to six months, 147 unless the
Board's order is complied with within this period.
14
JUDICIAL REVIEW 8
149
Substantively, judicial review is governed by section 45 of the Act.
It states in subsection (1) :

An appeal shall lie on a question of law to a Judge of the High
Court from a decision or order of the Board.
The good sense of such an appeals procedure is only matched by incredulity when one discovers that this appeals procedure was only introduced
in February 1974.150
Previously, appeals were governed by the Public Utilities Appeals
Rules 1957, and appeals against the Board's decisions were by way of
re-hearing in open court. 51 The real effect of the Appeals Rules 1957
was to give marginal importance to the Public Utilities Board, and utilities, desiring to do so could consider hearings before the Board as a
mere warming-up exercise before going to the court where the real hearing would take place. Since the procedure before the court was a rehearing, new evidence could be produced, 152 the evidence given before
the Board could be re-organized and presented differently, and really the
153
procedure before the Board was no more than a formality.
It is exceedingly difficult to understand why the Legislature should

have gone to such pains to establish the Board and in the same breath
emasculate it. However, the current judicial review procedure is salutary.
It is similar to the procedure in force in several states in the United
States of America. 54 The High Court of Barbados has rendered one
decision 155 since the new judicial review procedure came into force, and
the fundamental nature of the change has been clearly pointed out. As
Justice Williams said:
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It is to be noticed that these grounds of appeal are based on alleged errors of law. Under the new subsection (1) of section
[45] of the Public Utilities Act . . . as contained in section 4 of
the Public Utilities (Amendment) Act, 1974 No. 3, appeals to
this court are now restricted to those on matters oj law...
It is incumbent, therefore, on the appellant company, before
it can secure any relief on a ground of appeal, to show that a
question of law is involved and the court is only granted author156
ity to intervene where this is shown.
Whereas previously the High Court was free to review findings of
both fact and law, it is submitted that by virtue of the change, the
court's revisory power in relation to findings of fact will be severely
curtailed. It is further submitted that provided there is evidence before
the Board on which it can base a finding of fact, the decision of the
Board will be conclusive unless it can be shown that it is tainted with
fraud, 157 or that no tribunal could reasonably have come to such a conclusion in the light of all the evidence presented.158 It is also submitted
that the court cannot, therefore, substitute its own decision for that of
the Board simply because the court might have come to a different conclusion;159 the Board's decision would have to be unreasonable before
it can be set aside.
Questions of law can be reviewed; the pertinent section states this
in subsection (1). This, it is submitted, relates not only to straightforward questions of law as, for example, whether consideration is necessary in the formation of a valid contract according to the common law
of Barbados, but also to situations where the decision of the Board in
relation to findings of fact are so interwoven with or dependent upon
160
questions of law as to render the whole question one of law.
Whereas substantively judicial review is now more satisfactory, procedurally it is still decidedly anaemic. There is a gaping lacuna in public utility regulatory law in Barbados, for it is possible-and indeed it
61
has happened-for a utility to appear before the Board unopposed
and then appeal against the Board's decision if the Board does not give
it all it asks for, appearing before the High Court unopposed. 162 Such
occurrences make a mockery of a system based on the adversary principle. It is submitted that the Act is wholly unsatisfactory in this respect. 163 Only if someone other than the Board 64 complains will there be
adversaries to the utility in relation to any proceedings before the Board.
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Moreover, the prospect of bearing the costs of opposing the utility before
the Board and of an appeal, plus the risk of having to pay the costs
of the proceedings 165 may act as a powerful deterrent to potential
166
complainants.
It is submitted that the Act ought to be amended to provide that
counsel to the Board 167 shall appear in the defense of any decision of
the Board against which an appeal is made. 168 This amendment is absolutely necessary in the public interest.
CONCLUSION
It is now some twenty-one years since the Public Utilities Act commenced in Barbados. However, it may be argued that if it was the objective of the Legislature that regulation of the public utilities operating
in Barbados was to be done primarily by the Board, then that objective
has yet to be achieved.
Of the six decisions of the Board that have been appealed, the High
Court has overturned or substantially modified all except the last one
which was decided under the new appeals procedure. For all practical
purposes, therefore, the High Court has been the regulator of rates for
the public utilities in Barbados, and the result of each appeal, other than
the most recent, has been that the utilities concerned were awarded
more or less what they asked for.
However, in February 1974,169 the Legislature made an effort 170 to
confer on the Board the real power to regulate public utilities in Barbados. The clear intention of the Legislature was that the High Court
should exercise supervisory powers limited to the correction of any errors
of law that might occur in the course of proceedings before the Board.
Thus, the Board now potentially has the real legal power to play the
central role in the regulation of public utilities operating in Barbados
under the Act.
Desirably too, many of the matters "left at large"' 7 1 by the Act have
been satisfactorily resolved by the interpretative and improvisory ingenuity of the High Court of Barbados.
Nevertheless, a fundamental weakness remains. It is in the judicial
review procedure. The fact that a public utility in Barbados can appeal
a decision of the Board and argue its case before the High Court un-
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opposed is intolerable. An amendment to the Act
gested earlier in this paper is crucial in the public
cannot be exaggerated. Public utility regulation by
be really effective in Barbados until the Legislature
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along the lines suginterest. Its urgency
the Board shall not
cures this fatal flaw.

NOTES
1
Per S.E. Gomes, C.J. in Re The Barbados Light & Power Company Limited,
No.1 of 1956 (unreported) at p.14 of the transcript of the judgment.
2

There are three public utilities in Barbados which operate under the Public
Utilities Act: The Barbados Light & Power Co. Ltd.; The Barbados Telephone Co.
Ltd.; The Barbados Transport Corporation. S.2 Public Utilities Act Chapter (Cap.)
282, Laws of Barbados, Revised Edition (R/E) 1971.
3

Cap. 282, Laws of Barbados R/E 1971 (hereafter referred to as The Act).

4As amended by the Public Utilities (Amend.) Act 1974-3.
5

In S.3(1).

6The Public Utilities Board (hereinafter the Board); S.5 of the Act enacts
that the Board shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common
seal and that such seal shall be judicially noticed.
7

The Minister for Trade, Industry and Commerce.

8S.3(2).
9S.6.
1OPart III of the Act SS.15-22.
11S.16(l1).
12S.21(1).
131d.
14
Part VI of the Act SS.30-36. Of course the complainant must have locus
standi under the Act. S.30(1) gives locus standi to the Board, any person or company having an interest in the subject matter, and any public utility concerned.
Presumably by "company" the Act means a partnership acting under the firm
name, for it is a well settled legal principle that a company incorporated under
the Companies Act 1910 is a person in law, Salomon v. Salomon (1879) A.C. 22,
and would therefore be included in the term "person" used earlier in the subsection.

151d.
16S.31. Usually the Board gives the party 14 days within which to comply.
17 The decision as to whether or not a complaint has been satisfied is to be
made by the Board after a consideration of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the particular complaint.

18S.32(1).
19Supra, note, 17.
20S.32(2).
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211d. The subsection, therefore, gives the Board tremendous power in this respect, power which must be used wisely and well.
22S.33.
1

23 n England the telecommunications, electricity, transport and gas industries
are all nationalized and the appropriate Minister has ultimate responsibility for them
and is answerable to Parliament. See generally: S.J. Leacock, "Financial Obligations
of the Nationalized Industries in the United Kingdom", 1969 mimeo, School of Business Studies, City of London Polytechnic, London.
24

See generally Professor K.W. Patchett, "Reception of Law in the West Indies"
J.L.J. 1973, 17, 55 at p.30 where he states: ". . . the basic law for the peoples of
the Commonwealth Carribbean other than St. Lucia is the common law of England."
It is submitted that in St. Lucia English common law would be of the strongest
persuasive authority.
25
Per S.E. Gomes, C.J. in Re The Barbados Light & Power Co. Limited, No.1
of 1956 (unreported) at p. 2 of the transcript of the judgment. ". . . [C]ounsel stated
that . . . the Board, in its reasons for its findings, appears to have relied on one or
two such authorities ... "
26
Re The Barbados Light & Power Co. Ltd. This case is dealt with in some
detail in this article as it has been followed by the later cases.
27

Under what is now S.45 of the Act.

2t

The term Chief Judge has since been changed to Chief Justice.

29Id.
30P.14 of the transcript of the judgment.
311d. p.2.
32

Supra, note 1.

331d. p.4.
34d. pp.4-5. (Italics added.)
351d. p.5.
36Id.
371d.
3

8Supra, note 28.

39 Supra, note 35.
40169 U.S. 466.
41Supra, note 35.
42
This applies whether the utility is a private enterprise or a nationalized industry; Walcott Lime Works and the Barbados Potteries Ltd. v. The Natural Gas
Corporation (1959) 1 W.I.R. 214, per Stoby, C.J. at p.218 ". . . do these principles
mean that the rate base formula is inapplicable to nationalized undertakings? . . .
in the fixing of rates some method has to be devised and the textwriters to whom I
have been referred both agree that while there may exist a difference of opinion as
to how the rate base should be arrived at there is no disagreement that the rate base
formula is the recognized and accepted method." (Italics added.)
431d. p.8.
4Id. p.9.
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45Id. p.9. His Lordship selected method (c) and thereby established Barbados
as a "fair value" jurisdiction.
461d.
47E. Nichols, "Ruling Principles of Utility Regulation, Rate of Return", 1955,
Washington D.C. at p.408.
48M.p.8.
49

1n Re The Barbados Light & Power Company Limited, No.1 of 1956 (unreported) the Board had in fact found a rate base but it had arrived at the rate
base after a consideration of the capital structure of the Barbados Electric Supply
-Corporation which had in fact sold its assets to the Barbados Light and Power
Company Limited. The rate hearing had been entered upon by the Board as a result
of an application of the Barbados Light and Power Company Limited for an increase in its rates and did not involve the7 Barbados Electric Supply Corporation at
all. As S.E. Gomes, C.J. pointed out at p. of the transcript, the concept of a company as a separate legal entity had been settled by the House of Lords in England
long ago in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. (1879) A.C. 22. He pointed out that the
Board ought to have addressed itself, therefore, to the valuation of the Barbados
Light and Power Company Limited. "The Board ought to have realized that an
entirely new and independent entity would arise," once the assets had been bought
by the Barbados Light and Power Co. Ltd.
5Old. p.9.
51Id. p.10.
52

1n the recent rate hearing Re Barbados Light & Power Co. Ltd. before the
Board on March 14, 1974, a valuation of the Company's property as at December
31, 1972 done by the expert utility valuing company of International Middle West
Service Company was accepted by the Board as the proper rate base for the utility
in that hearing. The Barbados Light & Power Co. Ltd. is a subsidiary (75% equity
owned) of Canadian International Power Ltd., a multinational corporation incorporated in Canada.
53Re The Barbados Telephone Co. Ltd. Before the Board, May 3, 1974. The
Barbados Telephone Co. Ltd. is a subsidiary (86% equity owned) of Continental
Telephone International Corporation, a multinational corporation incorporated in the
United States of America.
54 In fact they were not accepted until the Board was satisfied that they were
the ". . . least unreliable guide . . ." p.8. of the transcript of the Board's decision.
5

SPer S.E. Gomes, C.J. Id. p.10.

1
56E. Nichols, op.cit. p.9 .

57Per S.E. Gomes, C.J. Id. p.13. The Act deals with services and facilities in
ss.23-28.
58Re The Barbados Light & Power Co. Ltd. Before the Board on March 14,
1974.
59Id. p. 6. of the transcript.
6

OSupra, note 53.

2
61Id. at p.1 of the transcript.
62
Per Stoby, C.J. in Walcott Lime Works & The Barbados Potteries Limited v.
in Re
The Natural Gas Corporation (1959) 1 W.I.R. 214, 217. Per S.E. Gomes, C.J.
4
The Barbados Light & Power Co. Ltd., No.1 of 1956 (unreported) at p. of the
transcript. ". . . [T]he onus of the Company under section [22] is to prove that its

PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION

proposed rate is fair and reasonable. In my view the burden of proving a positive and
the burden of proving a negative is not, or is not necessarily, the same: nor is the
method of proof necessarily the same. I, therefore, consider that the Board ought
not to have put the company to proof that the present rates were unjust and unreasonable but to proof that the proposed rate was fair and reasonable . .
63S.30(1).
64S.19(2) states that the Board may enter upon a hearing. The Board is, therefore, given a discretion in this respect by the subsection.
65

Per Sotby, C.J. Id.

66

Whether the complainant is the utility or some other person.

67

Supra, note 65.

681d.
69

Re The Barbados Light & Power Co. Ltd., No.1 of 1956 (unreported at p.2. of
the transcript.
70S.30.
71Ss.31-32; S.19(2).
72A person having an interest in the subject matter has been defined in America
as:

"One who has a legal right which will be injuriously affected." See Black
River Electric Cooperation Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 238 SC 282;
120 SE 2d 6 (1961); Hammon Lumber Co. v. Public Service Commission,
96 0, 595; 185 P.639 (1920); American Jurisprudence 2nd ed. (1972) Vol
64 §287, complaints should only be made after careful consideration, for
s.56 of the Act confers on the Board discretion in relation to the award of
costs. The Board may award a fixed sum, or may tax the costs; it may
prescribe a scale under which the costs will be taxed and may order by
whom they will be taxed. Further, under s.30(3) the Board may require
any complainant to give security for the costs of any hearing or investigation that arises out of his complaint.
731d.
74S.4.

75"... an operative prejudice whether conscious or unconscious." R. v. Queen's
County, JJ. [1908] 2 I.R. 294, per Lord O'Brien, L.J.
76This panel is established under S.4(1) of the Act and consists of not more
than six persons to be nominated by the Minister after consultation with such
public utilities as he shall see fit.
77S.4(3).
7

SUnless, of course, perjury is established.

79

Under Order 19 r.7 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (U.K.) which applies
in Barbados by virtue of s.13 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1956 (1956-56)
which states:
".. . where no special provision is contained in this Act or in rules of court
with reference thereto, every such jurisdiction shall be exercised as nearly
as may be in accordance with the practice and procedure for the time being
in force in the Supreme Court of Judicature in England."
There being no special provision on this point enacted in Barbados.
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0In R. v. Perks [19731 Crim. L.R. 388 the defendant was convicted of theft.
During the defendant's examination-in-chief, the judge had asked 147 out of a total
of 700 questions and had interrupted the defendant's counsel during his final address. On appeal, the Court of Appeal in England allowed the appeal, holding that
the interruptions were of a hostile nature and hindered the development of the
defendant's evidence-in-chief.

81R. v. Sussex JJ., exp. McCarthy [1924] 1 K.B. 256. It is submitted that
"seem" to be impartial is more logical than "seen" to be impartial, and indeed use
of the word "seen" in the judgment might well have been a mistake in the report.
See S.A. de Smith, "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" 3rd ed., London,
1973 p.218, footnote 28. Besides, "seem" is to be preferred because it would tend
to preserve a greater degree of skepticism and, threfore, a greater degree of wariness as to whether it is actually being done or not. Of course whether "seem" or
"seen" is used the idea is the same. Impartiality is intangible; it is a state of mind
or of the intellect. It is an inner fact and thus invisible and cannot be perceived
through the use of any of the five senses. The appearance of impartiality can certainly be perceived through the behavior of the particular individual. If, for example,
an aggressive and belligerent manner of questioning is adopted, or nodding in
apparent approval when one party is speaking and grimacing and looking threatening when the other party speaks, or, of course, stating that one will decide in favor
of one of the parties before all the evidence has been heard would clearly tend to
show absence of impartiality. But see also, R. v. Hircock [1969] 1 All E.R. 47,
where at the trial of four accused, each of whom was separately represented, it was
alleged that the judge showed considerable impatience. It was alleged that when the
last of the four defence counsel to address the jury said that he would review the
cases for the other defendants, as well as his client, the judge exclaimed in a loud
voice "Oh God", laid his head across his arm and made groaning noises. However,
none of these matters appeared in the transcript. The English Court of Appeal drew
a distinction between interruptions and conduct by the judge which might prevent
a defendant from developing his case (see: supra note 80), and conduct which might
be discourteous and unbecoming. The former might well amount to a valid ground
of appeal but the latter would not. The conduct in this case fell into the latter
category, thus the appeal was dismissed.
821d. SA(4). Although any assessor appointed under the Act "shall . . . exercise
all the powers and functions of a member of the Board," the Act specifically states
that "the decision of the Board shall be the decision of the members only excluding
any such assessor .. ." (Italics added.)
3

8 See Professor C.M. Schmitthoff, The Export Trade, 5th ed., London, 1969 at

3 8

p. 4 . "The two arbitrators in a commercial arbitration have often an unusual dual
role in so far as they are judges and advocates in the same person." The assessors'
dual role is that of judge during the presentation of the evidence and advisor during the deliberations after all the evidence has been taken, he is judge and advisor
in the same person. Of course, the assessor selected to represent the interests of the
users of the particular utility has a third role, that of advocate for the users of the
particular utility. Thus he has a treble role.
84 Per Diplock, L.J. in Wessanen's Koninklijke Fabrikien v. Isaac Modiano
& Sons Ltd. [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1243, 1247 quoted in Schmitthoff, op. cit.
Brother
p.34 8 .
85S.4(2).
86S.4(1).
871d.
88The Act does not give the assessor chosen from the panel a mandate to represent the interests of the utility which is before the Board, it stops short of that.
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891W.
90

Supra, note 82. The reasons for the exclusion are self-evident.

91See generally: R.F. Reid, Administrative Law and Practice, Toronto, 1971
pp.219-248; S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 3rd. ed. London, 1973 pp.215-245; Chuks Okpaluba, Judicial Review of Administrative Action
in Guyana, Georgetown, 1972 pp.33-36.
92

1nfra, note 98.

93

"They consist essentially of a neutral judge deciding contests brought before
him by others upon facts which are revealed only in a hearing attended by all persons having an interest." R.F. Reid op. cit. 221.
94
Being necessary to help engender respect for, confidence in, and satisfaction
in the operation of the law, thereby reducing desires for self-help.
95

Supra, note 24.

96Frome v. Bath Justices [1926] A.C. 586, 590.
97Per Lush J. in Serjeant v. Dale (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 558, 567 "One important object at all events is to clear away everything which might engender suspicion and
distrust of the tribunal, and so to promote the feeling of confidence in the administration of Justice which is so essential to social order and security."
98Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Proprietors (1852) 3 H.L.C. 759; 10 E.R. 301.
For a recent article on this topic, see: D.E.C. Yale, (1974) C.L.J. vol. 33 pt. 1 p. 8 0 .
99M.
10ld, per Ld. Campbell 10 E.R. 301, at p.315.
101S.14 does not state that a declaration has to be made but in practice such
a declaration has to be made before the instrument of appointment is effected by
the Minister concerned.
102 Per Blackburn J. in R. v. Hammond (1863) 9 L.T. (N.S.) 423. "The interest ... may be less than a farthing but still it is an interest."
103S.14 prohibits any member or officer of the Board from having any pecuniary
interest such as those set out in the section in any public utility. The section does
not limit itself to pecuniary interests in public utilities governed by the Act, but it
is submitted that it does carry this limitation, for it is difficult to see how a pecuniary interest in a public utility not governed by the Act would be relevant. The
section has a proviso which excludes the mere user of the services of any public
utility (e.g., being a telephone subscriber or using the bus service) from falling
within the definition of prohibited pecuniary interests for the purposes of the section. S.8 of the Act makes provision for a member who is interested in any matter before the Board to be replaced by a temporary appointee not so interested.
1041d. per Ld. Brougham 10 E.R. 301 at p.315. "The learned Judges . . . have
come to a clear opinion . . . that the decree is not void, but only voidable;"
10sIf a member or officer has a pecuniary interest falling specifically within
s.14, it is submitted that this would be directly in breach of the section which is
drafted in mandatory terms and would, therefore, render any decision of the Board
involving the participation of such member or officer void. However, if the pecuniary interest falls outside s.14, then the ordinary principle of voidability would
apply.
1t 6Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1889)
43 Ch. D. 366.
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107R v. Allan 4 B & S 915. Where one of the convicting justices was a member of the committee of the Tees Salmon Fishery Landowners Association and had
been present at a meeting of the Association which authorized proceedings to be
taken against one Joseph Hodgson who was later convicted by the said justices.
381

3 79
per
lOt Leeson v. General Council of Med. Ed. and Reg. supra. pp.
Cotton L.J.
• . . Of course, the rule is very plain that no man can be plaintiff, or
prosecutor, in any action, and at the same time sit in judgment to decide
in that particular case...
Ought these two gentlemen . . . to be considered as complainants in this
case ?
• . . [T]his complaint made against Dr. Leeson was a complaint brought
forward by the Council to which neither of these two members of the
General Medical Council belonged...
[A]s regards the question whether they are to be considered as complainants here, we ought to look to substance, and not, because this complaint is brought by the Council in the name of the Union, to say that a
person, a member of a union, who has nothing to do and can have nothing
to do with bringing forward this complaint, is to be treated as a prosecutor
or as one of the persons who is bringing forward this complaint. The term
'prosecutor' is sometimes objected to, but I use it for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, it cannot be said that these two members were incompetent to act because they were adjudicating upon a complaint brought
forward by themselves; ...
[T]hey are not to be considered as complainants here-as persons who are
bringing forward this charge-and there was hardly any contention that
their position as members of the Union did actually involve a bias which
would prevent them from adjudicating on this case. (Italics added.)

109Depending on the circumstances.
11OId.
lilSupra, note 1. These "large interests" include the public interest S.32.
ll 2 Per Denning J. (as he then was) in Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2
AII.E.R. 372, 374.
"That degree is well settled. It must carry a reasonable degree of probability, not so high as is required in a criminal case. If the evidence is
such that the tribunal can say; 'we think it more probable than not', the
burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal it is not."
113[19241 1 K.B. 256.
1l4Glassman v. Council of College of Physicians and Surgeons [1966] 2 O.R.
Act and Stoller (1961) 25 D.L.R. (2d.) 410. See fur81; Re Public Accountancy
2 2 225
and the cases there cited.
ther: R.F. Reid op. cit. pp. 3115Supra, note 113.
11

6See supra, note 111 and the arguments in the text.
1171f a quorum cannot be formed without allowing a member subject to disqualification for bias to sit, it may be necessary for him to do so. See: S.A. de
Smith op. cit. 244 and the cases there cited. Under S.3(5) of the Act as amended,
three members constitute a quorum. The right to impugn the decision of a tribunal
for bias may also be waived, either expressly or impliedly. See: R.F. Reid op. cit.
236-237 and the cases there cited.
118R v. Peterborough Police Commissioners ex. p. Lewis (1965) 2 O.R. 577;
Re Public Accountancy Act and Stoller supra.; R v. Town of Glace Bay (19041)
36 N.S.R. 456.
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11
90'Krane v. Alcyon Shipping Co. Ltd. (1961) 27 D.L.R. (2d.) 775; per
Judson J. at pp. 7 7 9-780.
".. [Ilnterest or no interest this is expressly what the Board is authorized to do by the plain terms of the Act, and no such limitation can be
imposed on the plain meaning of the Act."
12 0

Supra, note 82.
12ISupra, note 103.
12 21talics added.
12 1

Supra, note 103.

124S4(4)
12 5

Added by S.2 Public Utilities (Amend.) Act. 1953 (1953-51).

12 6Supra, note 122.
127 They are only judges to the extent stated earlier in this article. See: Supra,
note 82 and the body of the text following.
128S.4(2). Italics added.
12 9The Act does not state the circumstances in which an assessor may be removed. It does state the circumstances in which a member of the Board may be
permanently removed, see: S.6(6); or may be temporarily replaced by a new appointee if such member has an interest in a matter before the Board, see: S.8.
However, it is submitted that assessors may be removed on grounds similar to those
on which a member may be removed: Viz. that the assessor was ". . . from any
just cause unfit to continue in office." See: S.6(6). It is submitted that bias in an
assessor in these circumstances would amount to "just cause" and would, therefore, be a sufficient ground for his removal. This would be effected by the appropriate Minister. A new appointment could then be made through the appointments
mechanism in S.4(2) and the new appointee could familiarize himself with any
previous proceedings through reading and studying the transcripts of those proceedings as well as through discussions with the members of the Board, the attorney to the Board and the other assessor if they sat during the proceedings.
13OSupra, note 103.
13t

Supra, note 82.
132Because the Act does not give such an assessor a mandate to represent the
interests of any utility.
1

33On the previous arguments in the text
134 They can presumably afford to retain counsel whereas the objectors may
not be able to do so or indeed there may be no objectors at all.
135S.35 of the Act.

136Before the Board May 3, 1974 (unreported).
137 In relation to confidence and privilege, see: Christine Boyle, "Confidence v.
Privilege" (1974) 25 N.I.L.Q. 31.
13 t

Fraserv.Evans [1969] 1 All.E.R.8, 11,

159S.43 of the Act.
140S.42 of the Act imposes a similar fine on summary conviction on any officer, employee or agent of any public utility (presumably governed by the Act) who
willfully refuses or fails to furnish any information or similar matter required of
him by the Board. S.39(2) imposes a $100 fine on summary conviction on every
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director and manager of a public utility which has failed to obey any order of the
Board unless he proves that he took all necessary steps to obey the order himself
and to secure obedience of the order by the public utility concerned, and that he
was not at fault for the failure to obey the order.
141
Re The Barbados Telephone Co. Ltd. before the Board May 3, 1974. (unreported).
142P.14 of the transcript of the evidence taken on the first day of the hearing.
14 3Supra, note 141.
144 Supra, note 142.
145S.38(2). This can only be done, in accordance with the procedure set out
in S.38(1), if the utility has failed to comply with an order made by the Board,
and the Board is of the opinion that no effectual means exist whereby it can enforce compliance with the order. Normally, where a public utility fails or refuses
to obey an order of the Board, under S.39(1) it is liable on summary conviction
to a fine of up to $1,000. Under Ss. 40,41 similar fines of $1,000 can be imposed
on summary conviction for breach of those sections.
146S.37(1). In such circumstances the Board must act for and in the interests
of the utility's shareholders, its creditors and the public.
t 4 7Proviso to S.37(1). After six months, the Board must then proceed under
S.38 and seek a winding up order from the court.
14

81n the United States of America the law governing judicial review ranges
from some jurisdictions which provide that findings of a public service commission on questions of fact shall be final and not subject to judicial review except
in relation to constitutional questions see: Napa Valley Electric Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 251 US 366 (1919) (California statute); to jurisdictions in which
judicial review governs questions of both fact and law, see: United Gas Pipe Line
Co. v. LouisianaPublic Service 241 La. 687; 130 So. 2d. 652 (1961).
149 As amended by the Public Utilities (Amend.) Act 1973 (1974-3). In reality,
this amending statute rewrote the whole judicial review procedure. Before the
amendment, S.45(3) had empowered the Chief Judge to appoint not more than
two persons who, in his opinion, were well qualified by reason of their knowledge
and experience to assist in the determination of any question arising before him.
The subsection was invoked in Re The Barbados Telephone Co. Ltd. 1970 (unreported); and in Re The Barbados Telephone Co. Ltd. 1973 (unreported). This
subsection has now been repealed by the Public Utilities (Amend.) Act 1973
(1974-3).
150The above amendment came into force on February 7, 1974.
15t Rule 3 of the Public Utilities Appeals Rules 1957 (no longer in force).
152 See: S.E. Gomes, C.J. in Re Barbados Light & Power Co. Ltd. No.1 of 1956.
2
(unreported) at p. of the transcript:
This . . . caused counsel to refer to four American text books on the
subject of public utilities as decisions of the Court there are not available
here. Those authorities were not referred to in the proceedings before the
Board ...

(Italics added.)

In an American case it was held that the parties may not withold evidence
from the Commission and then produce it in court. See: New England Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Utilities 262 Mass 137, 159 NE 743 (1928).
Of course if the trial before the court is a trial de novo, new evidence can be
introduced, see: United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Tex. 303 US 123 (1927); reh.den.
303 US 667 (1937).
In "Public Utility Regulation and Management in the Government of Trinidad
and Tobago" A Survey Report, Chicago, 1961, The Report had recommended at
p. A-11 that:
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On an appeal no additional evidence should be introduced: [if] new evidence has developed, the matter should be remanded to the Commission for
consideration. (Italics added.)
This recommendation, it is submitted, is entirely reasonable and could usefully
be adopted by the Barbados legislature.
1530f nine rate hearings held before the Board since 1955 (B'dos. Light &
Power Co. Ltd. 1956, 1974; B'dos. Tel. Co. Ltd. 1957, 1970, 1972, 1974; The Natural Gas Corp. 1959; B'dos. Transport Corp. 1972, 1975), in six of them the utilities appealed and in five of the appeals the High Court set aside the decision of
the Board. On the sixth occasion (Re The B'dos. Tel. Co. Ltd. No.416 of 1974 (unreported)) the appeal had to be considered under the new judicial review procedure.
It was the first appeal since the new procedure came into force. The utility succeeded on one ground and one sub-ground of eight grounds of appeal on which
it sought to rely. Of the remaining three rate hearings, in Re The B'dos. Light &
Power Co. Ltd. before the Board Mar. 1974 (unreported) the utility was granted
all the increases it sought and no appeal was made; and in Re The B'dos. Transport Corp. before the Board 1972, and 1975 (unreported) no appeals were made.

t 54 See generally, American Jurisprudence, 2nd.3d. (1972),

Vol. 64 §276-291.

15 5

Re The Barbados Telephone Co. Ltd. No.416 of 1974 (unreported).

156Id. at p.5 of the transcript of the judgment. (Italics added.)

15 7For the American position see: Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co.
52 Utah 210; 173, p.556 (1918) where it was held that, unless it is expressly empowered by statute, the power of the court to review the decision of the Public
Service Commission in fixing a rate for a public service corporation is limited to
determining whether or not there is any evidence to sustain the finding of fact
made by the commission.
t58This would make the matter, it is submitted, a question of law. See: Denning J. (as he then was) in Bracegirdle v. Oxley [1947] K.B. 349, 358:
The question whether a determination by a tribunal is a determination
in point of fact or in point of law frequently occurs. On such a question
there is a distinction that must always be kept in mind, namely the distinction between primary facts and conclusions from those facts . . . The
determination of primary facts is always a question of fact . . . The conclusions from those facts are sometimes conclusions of fact and sometimes
conclusions of law . . . The court will only intervene if the conclusion
cannot reasonably be drawn from the primary facts . . . (Italics added.)
Per Lord Reid in Griffiths v. J.P. Harrison (Watford) Ltd. [1963] A.C. 1, 16.
Where . . . the question is a question of fact, that means that the decision
- . . cannot be reviewed by the court. But if the decision of any tribunal
on a question of fact is unreasonable, looking to the facts on which it is
based, the court can and must intervene. . . . [T/he question . . . is, therefore, not whether [the tribunal was] wrong, but whether their decision was
unreasonable. (Italics added.)
Per Justice Williams in Re The Barbados Telephone Co. Ltd. No.416 of 1974
(unreported), at p.9 of the transcript of the judgment.
. . . [Dletermination of the primary facts is not a matter of law, but
to make a finding unsupported by any evidence is an error of law. (Italics
added.)
159 See: State ex rel. North Carolina Utilities Comm. v. Southern R. Co. 267 NC.
317; 148 SE 2d. 210 (1966). See too Justice Williams in Re The Barbados Telephone Co. Ltd. supra, where in relation to vehicle expenses disallowed by the Board
his Lordship said at p.29 of the transcript of the judgment:
This is a matter on which the Board has made a decision not to allow
certain amounts as operating expenses. Opinions will differ on whether or
not it is a good decision in the light of modern business practice but in

LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS

my view it is a decision well within the functions of the Board in supervising utilities in the public interest and no question of law has been shown
which would entitle this court to interfere. (Italics added.)
16OThis principle is also recognized by some American courts: See: Hocking
Valley R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission 92 Ohio St. 9; 110 NE 521 (1915).
t 1
6 The utility appeared unopposed in: Re Barbados Light & Power Co. Ltd.
1956; in Re The Barbados Telephone Co. Ltd. 1957; and in Re The Barbados Light
& Power Co. Ltd. 1974. Of course if assessors are appointed for the hearing, then
the interests of the users of the public utility concerned will have fuller representation, through cross-examination of the witnesses by the assessors, as well as advice to the Board. There is also the cross-examination and advice of the attorney to
the Board.
16 2

1n Re The Barbados Light & Power Co. Ltd. No.1 of 1956 (unreported) ; and
in Re The Barbados Telephone Co. Ltd. 1957 (unreported).
163
1n the United States appeals against the decision of the public utilities regulatory authority are brought against the regulatory authority, which then has to
defend its decision. This ensures that decisions of the regulatory authority are
defended when appealed against. The idea of allowing regulatory authority decisions to be assailed on appeal undefended is really such a ridiculous proposition
in a system based on the adversary principle that in the United States it is unthinkable, and the structure of the judicial review procedure makes it for all practical purposes impossible.

164 Per S.E. Gomes C.J. in Re The Barbados Light & Power Co. Ltd. No.1 of
1956 (unreported) at p.2 of the transcript of the judgment:
. . . [T]he Board . . . having given a judicial or quasi-judicial decision,
could not be heard as advocate in the matter.
Indeed the Board has no accusatorial function except to complain under S.30(1)
if in the circumstances it thinks fit to do so; or to apply for a winding up order
under S.38(2). In California "a public service commission with power to determine
controverted facts between private litigants and decide thereon, exercises judicial
powers . . ." American Jurisprudence, 2nd.ed. (1972) Vol. 64 §276; also Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Eshelman 166 Cal. 640; 137 P.1119 (1913).
165The award of the costs of proceedings before the Board lies in the discretion of the Board s.56; and on appeal, in the discretion of the judge S.45(5).
6
16 Undoubtedly the risk of bearing costs would tend to deter frivolous complaints, and this is certainly highly desirable.
167 Duly supported by other attorneys where necessary.
16SAlternatives such as e.g. having the Attorney-General or Solicitor-General
appear as amicus curiae are less satisfactory, for counsel to the Board would have
been present throughout the hearing and during the deliberations of the Board and
would, therefore, be more conversant with all the facets of the issues. In any event,
no appearance of this kind has apparently yet occurred and there is little reason
to think that it might happen in the future. Besides, a formal statutory procedure
is to be preferred.
9
16 The date when the Public Utilities (Amend.) Act 1973 (1974-3) came into
force.
170The future will show whether it has been successful or not.
171Supra, note 1.

